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INTRODUCTION AND REVIEW
Private sector unionization in the U.S. has long been declining. After reaching a
high mark of 35.6 percent of the civilian workforce in 1954, union density has fallen
steadily, to 9.8 percent in 1997. Seminal studies by Ashenfelter and Pencavel [1969],
Pencavel [1971], and Bain and Elsheikh [1976] have spawned a vast literature in which
researchers seek to identify factors responsible for the decline. Factors in the decline
include changes in the structure of the economy, management opposition to orga-
nized labor, and other socio-political factors.1
The structure of compensation also has changed dramatically over time. In 1948
non-wage benefits accounted for nearly 4.5 percent of total compensation; by 1994
that ratio had more than quadrupled, to 19 percent [U.S. Bureau of Economic Analy-
sis, 1998]. Despite this correlation of events, illustrated in Figure 1, there has been no
analysis whether the composition of pay has affected organized labor.
Benefits take many forms, for example, health care insurance, pension fund-
ing, vacation pay, or employer payments for social security and unemployment
insurance. The costliest benefits to provide are paid leave, health insurance, and
social security contributions [U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 1997; Lettau and
Buchmueller, 1999]. The first two are provided voluntarily; social security is man-
dated by law. Most fringe benefits are paid voluntarily, with mandated benefits
constituting roughly only one-third of fringe payments.2 This study examines
whether there is a relationship between benefits and unionization.
Union members receive greater non-wage benefits, on average, than nonunion
workers (see Freeman and Medoff [1984]). Moreover, organized labor has bargained
and lobbied for welfare improvements, like shorter working hours, compensation
for workplace injuries, and unemployment insurance. Many improvements sought564 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
FIGURE 1
Union Density Nationwide:  Percentage of Private
 Non-farm Labor Force that is Unionized
Non-wage Pay:  Percentage of Total Compensation
by organized labor, in fact, have been institutionalized by statute. Ironically, this
legislative success might undermine support for organized labor.
Some scholars have argued that governmental mandates can replace some union
functions. This “substitution hypothesis” was advanced by Neumann and Rissman
[1984], who reported that union membership is inversely related to government work-
place protections and social welfare programs.3 According to Bennett and Taylor [2001,
p. 261], government-mandated benefits reduce the “scope of issues that may be ad-
dressed at the bargaining table.” So if legislation makes certain benefits universal,
unionization could suffer.4 In fact, Fiorito [2001] found an inverse relationship be-
tween voluntary provision of benefits and workers’ intentions to vote for union certi-
fication.
Some benefits, like health insurance, can provide tax breaks for both firms and
workers, so both sides have reasons to favor them. But employers may have another
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efits are suspended during a strike. Wages can be partially replaced, by union strike
funds or if workers take temporary jobs elsewhere. But temporary jobs typically pro-
vide no benefits, meaning health care coverage is lost during a strike. As health care
has become increasingly expensive, workers may be reluctant to jeopardize their cov-
erage by risking prolonged industrial action.5
As fringe benefits have become more universal, that may have removed issues
from potential collective bargaining. And as fringe benefits have become a more promi-
nent feature of compensation, support for organized labor may have weakened.
This article extends research on the decline of organized labor by analyzing the
impact of non-wage benefits on unionization. Specifically, we expand Pencavel’s [1971]
econometric specification to estimate how the growing role of benefits has affected
union density. Thus, our study documents whether the “substitution hypothesis” can
be amended. Using time-series observations for 1948-1997, we examine whether union-
ization nationwide has been influenced by the changing composition of pay. With cross-
sectional data for 1983-1996, we also analyze the repercussions for organized labor
across states.
BENEFITS AND UNIONIZATION: NATIONWIDE ANALYSIS
Data and Sample
Prior to World War II non-wage benefits were negligible. During the war pay
freezes were imposed, so benefits became a means of increasing total compensation. A
consistent fringe benefits series for the economy extends back to 1948; the latest
information we have is for 1997. Thus, our sample covers the fifty-year period 1948-
1997. In our regression analysis, we use FRINGE as an explanatory variable, which
represents the percentage of total compensation accounted for by non-wage benefits
(see appendix for all data sources).
The dependent variable is UNIZ, the fraction of the private, non-farm labor force
that is unionized. Previous empirical studies have used different data to represent
this series. A popular series has been constructed by Troy and Sheflin [1985], which is
based on the financial reports filed by organized labor under the Landrum-Griffin Act.
For each union, they divided per capita revenue by the organization’s per capita dues
rate to compute average annual, full-time, dues-paying members. Summing over all
unions yields the overall level of membership. Unfortunately, the Troy and Sheflin
series was discontinued after 1982.
Currently the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) compiles a union density
series using data from the Current Population Survey (CPS). Because of changes in
bureaucracy and survey design, the CPS does not provide a consistent unionization
series prior to 1959. Moreover, for 1982 the CPS provided no data on union membership.
Some authors have asserted — without elaboration — that the Troy and Sheflin
series has fewer inaccuracies than the CPS series (for example, Neumann and Rissman
[1984, p. 178]). But what happens when one seeks to analyze unionization after 1982,
when the Troy and Sheflin series was discontinued? In that case it has been common
to combine the two series.6 Following the same approach, we combined the Troy and566 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
Sheflin and CPS data to construct a UNIZ series for 1948-1997. Specifically, we used
Troy and Sheflin observations for 1948-1982 and CPS figures for 1983-1997.
Specification
We estimate an equation for unionization at time t (UNIZt) using a specification
similar to that first proposed by Ashenfelter and Pencavel [1969] and Pencavel [1971],
who specified union density as a function of (1) previous unionization, (2) labor market
factors, (3) structural factors, and (4) the socio-political environment. We add to this
list by including FRINGE as an explanatory variable. Specifically, we hypothesize the
following relationship for UNIZt:
(1) UNIZt = β0 +β1UNIZt-1 + β2FRINGEt + β3RAISEt + β4DEMOCRATt +
β5MANUFACTUREt + β6∆UNFAIRt + β7UNEMPLOYt + β8CPSt + εt,
where the explanatory variables are as follows:
UNIZt-1: union density (lagged),
FRINGEt: share of total compensation accounted for by non-wage benefits,
RAISEt: percentage change in “wage only” component of pay (1992 dol-
lars) for private, non-farm, production workers,
DEMOCRATt: percentage of Democrat members of Congress,
MANUFACTUREt: share of the civilian labor force in the manufacturing sector,
∆UNFAIRt: change in the number of unfair labor practice allegations filed
by firms against organized labor,
UNEMPLOYt: civilian unemployment rate, and
CPSt: 0-1 variable, equals 1 for 1983-1997 (when CPS data are used
in the UNIZ series).
We follow other researchers in using the lagged value of union density, UNIZt-1, as
an explanatory variable [Pencavel 1971; Moore et al., 1989; Neumann and Rissman,
1984]. This variable accounts for possible inertia in union membership. That is, workers
who belonged to a union in time period t-1 are likely to be members in time period t, so
we expect a direct relationship between UNIZt and UNIZt-1, meaning β1 > 0.
Labor market factors like benefits and pay hikes may influence union member-
ship. To represent these influences, we use as explanatory variables FRINGE and
RAISE. FRINGE represents the share of total compensation due to non-wage ben-
efits. RAISE is the percentage change in (real) wage for production workers.
If the substitution hypothesis is correct, then as benefits become a more promi-
nent component of compensation, other things equal, union density will decrease.
Thus, there would be a negative relationship between UNIZ and FRINGE, β2 < 0.
For a given FRINGE rate, suppose there is a bigger raise in take-home pay. The
impact on unionization is not clear a priori. If workers are collecting bigger wage
hikes, for a given split between wage and benefits, they may not be stirred to support
unionization. On the other hand, they may desire union representation to protect567 DECLINING UNIONIZATION: DO FRINGE BENEFITS MATTER?
relatively generous pay scales. Therefore, the influence of RAISE on UNIZ may be
positive or negative.
The remaining explanatory variables control for other economic and socio-politi-
cal factors. To proxy the political climate, we follow previous studies by including
DEMOCRAT. Others have argued that a pro-union legislative climate is more likely
to emerge the more there is Democratic Party representation in Congress [Ashenfelter
and Pencavel, 1969; Bain and Elsheikh, 1976]. Over the sample period, the Demo-
cratic share of Congress fluctuated between 43 percent and 68 percent, averaging
nearly 58 percent. We expect a positive relationship between UNIZ and DEMOCRAT,
β4 > 0.
Changes in the structure of the economy may affect union density. When consid-
ering structural change it has been common to focus on manufacturing, a traditional
bastion of organized labor [Lumsden and Petersen, 1975; Stepina and Fiorito, 1986].
That sector’s share of the civilian labor force, denoted by MANUFACTURE, has fallen
steadily, from nearly 28 percent to little more than 15.5 percent. We expect decreases
in MANUFACTURE to inhibit unionization, β5 > 0.
The variable ∆UNFAIR can be used to reflect changes in the industrial relations
climate. Since the late 1940s the number of unfair labor practice claims filed by firms
has averaged 2,487 per year, but has varied considerably, from 480 to 5,048. An in-
crease in unfair labor practice filing with the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB)
could reflect a managerial tactic to oppose organized labor. More allegations by firms
could, however, also be a result of increased union assertiveness. If such assertiveness
is seen as a benefit of union membership, the effect on UNIZ could be positive. There-
fore, the sign for the ∆UNFAIR can be used to reflect changes in the industrial rela-
tions climate. The sign of the coefficient could be either positive or negative.
Earlier studies account for unemployment (or some measure of employment) as a
determinant of union membership (for example, Koeller [1994]). Higher unemploy-
ment could lead workers to seek collective power and protection. But when jobless-
ness is more widespread, workers might shun unionization because they are worried
about antagonizing employers.
The union density variable UNIZ consists of observations from the Troy and Sheflin
series (1948-1982) and the CPS (1983-1997). In constructing series for their studies,
other researchers have ignored this break. But Figure 1 shows that union density
drops following the 1983 break point. This fall could coincide with economic and social
factors. It also could be that the CPS figures record lower rates of unionization than
did Troy and Sheflin. To account for the structural break in the UNIZ variable, we
also included an indicator variable CPS (equals 1 for 1983-1997; 0 otherwise). If the
break results in a lower measure of union density, there will be a negative coefficient
on the CPS variable, β8 < 0.7
Stationarity
To determine whether simple OLS regression can be used to estimate the union
density equation, we must first determine whether the data are stationary. With non-
stationary data there might be a problem of spurious correlation: The time-varying568 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
nature of the series may — but not necessarily — lead OLS estimates to appear
significant when they are merely happenstance [Dhrymes, 1998, pp. 55-71; Kennedy,
1998, pp. 268-69].
We tested the data for stationarity following the procedure outlined by Enders
[1995, pp. 256-60].8 All the series are stationary except the FRINGE variable. Figure 1
shows that values for FRINGE increased between 1948 and 1993, dropping off thereaf-
ter. This observation led us to test whether FRINGE was stationary for 1948-1993.
Focusing only on this subperiod, we found that FRINGE indeed was stationary. There-
fore we used the shorter data set initially, using OLS regression to estimate a union
density equation. We then estimated a separate equation with the full data set to see
whether the results of the two analyses are similar.
Empirical Results
Focusing on the truncated sample, 1948-1993, we estimated the union density
equation and report the results in Table 1 (left column). Lagged union density has a
significantly positive coefficient. Increasing UNIZt-1 by 10 points adds 8.0 points to the
UNIZt measure. Not surprisingly, past membership has a positive impact on current
unionization.
Our principal interest is in identifying any FRINGE effect. The coefficient on
FRINGE is negative, as hypothesized, and statistically significant. Holding other eco-
nomic and socio-political factors constant, increasing the share for non-wage benefits
reduces union density. Increasing FRINGE by 10 points reduces union density by
almost 3.1 points. Not only is this estimate statistically significant, it is also quite
large. To put it into perspective, between 1948 and 1993 FRINGE rose from 4.57
percent to 18.89 percent, an increase of 14.32 points. Other things equal, approxi-
mately 4.42 points of the drop in UNIZ (-0.309 x 14.32) is due to the FRINGE effect.
That is, more than fifteen percent of the decline in unionization can be attributed to
the growing influence of benefits.
The RAISE variable also exhibits a negative influence on union density. The coef-
ficient estimate implies that increasing a wage hike by one percentage point shaves
UNIZ by more than one-tenth of a point. For a given FRINGE level, bigger pay raises
for production workers evidently do not stir up support for organized labor.
Union density is also affected by other factors. The DEMOCRAT coefficient is
significantly positive, suggesting that union density is affected by the political climate.
 Changes in the industrial relations climate also influence unionization. The ∆UNFAIR
coefficient is negative, albeit small, suggesting that there is some managerial opposi-
tion that inhibits organized labor. Our estimates also indicate that it is important to
account for the break in the UNIZ series. Controlling for other factors, union density
is nearly 0.7 points lower using the CPS data. The MANUFACTURE coefficient is
positive as expected, but not significant.
In addition to the OLS regression for the truncated sample, we also estimated an
equation for the full data set, 1948-1997 (Table 1, right column). Again we find that
FRINGE has a statistically negative impact on unionization: a 10-point rise in FRINGE,
other factors held constant, leads to a 2.8 point drop in union density. For the full fifty-569 DECLINING UNIONIZATION: DO FRINGE BENEFITS MATTER?
TABLE 1
Determinants of Union Density Nationwide, 1948-1997†
Regression 1: Regression 2:
1948-1993 1948-1997
Explanatory Coefficient    Coefficient
  Variable   Hypothesis  (t-statistic)   (t-statistic)
Constant + or - 7.0163 ** 5.9124 **
(3.9265) (5.5707)
UNIZ + 0.8035 ** 0.8251 **
(lagged) (12.5803) (15.9970)
FRINGE - -0.3092 ** -0.2846 **
(-6.3222) (-6.9642)
RAISE + or - -0.1075 ** -0.1148 **
(-2.8318) (-3.7273)
DEMOCRAT + 0.0256 *** 0.0269 **
(1.9061) (2.7236)
MANUFACTURE + 0.0421 0.0470
(0.4861) (0.5965)
∆UNFAIR + or - -0.0002 *** -0.0002 **
(-1.9769) (-2.7406)
UNEMPLOY + or - -0.0977 -0.1022 ***
(-1.5030) (-1.7600)
CPS (=0 thru 1982; - -0.6831 ***        -0.5173 ***
         =1 otherwise) (-1.8714)       (-1.9700)
R
2 0.998 0.998
† Sources are detailed in the appendix.
** Significant at the 0.05 level.
*** Significant at the 0.10 level.
year sample, non-wage benefits climbed from 4.57 percent of pay to 16.93 percent, a
rise of 11.46 points. Thus, 3.27 points of the drop in UNIZ (-0.285 x 11.46), nearly
twelve percent of the fall in union density, is due to the expanded role of fringe benefits.
Comparing the regression results from the full data set with those from the trun-
cated sample, the estimates are quite similar (see Table 1). All coefficient signs are
the same and the estimated values are of similar magnitude. The t-statistics are all
similar, with one exception. Using the full data set, it can be seen that UNIZ suffers
as unemployment increases.9
Because the two estimated equations are so alike, the fact that FRINGE is non-
stationary over the full sample period does not appear to lead to spurious regression
results. Otherwise, we would not expect the estimated equations to be so similar.
Increasing the share of benefits in the pay package has had a significantly nega-
tive impact on unionization nationwide. Controlling for other economic and social
factors, anywhere from twelve to seventeen percent of the decline in union density
can be attributed to the increased presence of benefits. These findings support the
substitution hypothesis that fringe benefits displace union services. Because unioniza-
tion is not evenly distributed across the country, the FRINGE impact may well differ
from state to state. Therefore we extend our analysis to consider unionization at the
state level.570 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
TABLE 2
Union Density and Fringe Benefits by State, 1983-1996†
UNIZ State FRINGE State UNIZ State FRINGE State
State (mean) Rank (mean) Rank State (mean) Rank (mean) Rank
Alabama* 23.23   18   19.38 10 Montana 25.95 12 21.23 2
Alaska 14.55   34   17.95 28 Nebraska* 16.68 29 17.83 31
Arizona*   4.94   51   17.58 35 Nevada*   9.23   44    17.93 29
Arkansas* 16.35   30   19.24 14 New Hamp.   7.99   46    18.12 25
California 15.10   32   17.50 38 New Jersey 24.21   15    14.83 50
Colorado   8.87 45 17.24 40 New Mexico   9.82   43    18.28 23
Connecticut 17.10   28   17.19 41 New York 25.14   13    15.96 47
Delaware 22.17   20   13.23 51 N. Carolina*   5.32   50    16.84 46
D.C. 14.49   35   14.93 49 N. Dakota* 18.94   23    19.08 16
Florida*   7.14   47   17.07 43 Ohio 33.75    4    20.09 7
Georgia* 11.54   39   17.15 42 Oklahoma 18.04   26    18.79 19
Hawaii 31.68    6   18.00 26 Oregon 22.41   19    16.86 45
Idaho* 18.10   25   17.06 44 Pennsylvania 29.82    7    18.63 20
Illinois 26.87   11   17.75 32 Rhode Is. 14.41   37    18.58 21
Indiana 38.37    2   20.43 4 S. Carolina*   5.65   49    17.69 34
Iowa* 27.77   10   20.27 5 S. Dakota* 11.53   40    17.96 27
Kansas* 20.13   21   20.18 6 Tennessee* 17.71   27    19.10 15
Kentucky 29.69    8   19.37 11 Texas* 10.10   42    17.56 36
Louisiana* 18.59   24   19.51 9 Utah* 6.93   48    17.56 37
Maine 23.88   16   21.20 3 Vermont 10.61   41    19.25 13
Maryland 23.71   17   18.87 18 Virginia* 14.57   33    17.85 30
Mass. 15.35   31   17.28 39 Washington 32.68    5    19.26 12
Michigan 37.91    3   19.91 8 W. Virginia 38.56    1    21.70 1
Minnesota 19.99   22   15.51 48 Wisconsin 29.28    9    18.55 22
Mississippi* 14.42   36   18.19 24 Wyoming* 13.38   38    19.05 17
Missouri 24.83   14   17.73 33
† Sources are detailed in the appendix.
* State with a Right-to-Work law.
BENEFITS AND UNIONIZATION: STATEWIDE ANALYSIS
Overview of the States
Union membership varies from state to state. Where union density is high and
unions are strong, organized labor may obtain high levels of compensation, both wages
and fringe benefits. In states where organized labor has not been strong, the structure
of compensation might have evolved differently. Given these possibilities, we examine
whether the influence of the benefits-wage mix differs across states.
For each of the fifty states and the District of Columbia, figures are available for
union density in manufacturing back to 1983. We use these observations to represent
UNIZ. Observations for FRINGE are available through 1996. Thus, our cross-sec-
tional analysis is for 1983-1996 (see appendix for all data sources). Mean observations
for each state are presented in Table 2.
There are wide variations in manufacturing union density, ranging from a low of
4.9 percent in Arizona to a high of 38.6 percent in West Virginia. Most fringe benefits
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narrower range for FRINGE. Values for FRINGE vary from a low of 13.2 percent in
Delaware to a high of 21.7 percent in West Virginia. Some of the lowest values for
FRINGE can be found along the Atlantic coast (Delaware, New Jersey, and New York)
while higher values occur in the Midwest (for example, Indiana, Iowa, and Ohio).
Curiously, both the highest and lowest FRINGE values occur in relatively high union
density states.
To illustrate some of the distinctions more clearly, Table 3 lists the five highest-
and lowest-ranked states according to unionization (top panel) and benefits (bottom
panel). The high UNIZ states exhibit above-average values for FRINGE, though there
is no direct correspondence in rankings. Unionization is least likely in southern and
western states with Right-to-Work (RTW) laws. These states also exhibit relatively
low FRINGE values, but again there is no direct correspondence in the rankings. A
simple Spearman rank correlation test confirms that the ranks of UNIZ and FRINGE
are indeed correlated.10
Specification
Nationwide, of course, unionization declined over the 1983-1996 sample period.
Every state experienced a drop in union density, though there was variation across
states.11 In our regression analysis we use union density in manufacturing in state i at
time t, UNIZit, as the dependent variable. We specify an equation similar to that for
the national level analysis:
(2) UNIZit = γ0 + γ1UNIZit-1 + γ2FRINGEit + γ3 RAISEit + γ4MFG SHAREit
+ γ5 ∆UNFAIRit + γ6RTWit + γ7UNEMPLOYit + ηit,
where FRINGE and RAISE are defined as before and the other explanatory variables are
UNIZt-1 union density (lagged),
MFG SHAREit state i’s share of U.S. manufacturing employment,
∆UNFAIR it change in the total number of unfair labor practice
allegations filed in the state,
RTWit 0-1 variable, equals 1 for a state with a Right-to-Work law, and
UNEMPLOYit unemployment rate in state i.
Similar to the national level analysis, we hypothesize γ1 > 0 and γ2 < 0, with no a priori
expectations for γ3 or γ7.
The structure of a state’s economy is likely to affect union density. We use MFG
SHARE, a state’s share of U.S. manufacturing employment, to reflect that state’s
economic profile. Across the states, MFG SHARE varies from a low of 0.1 percent to a
high of 11 percent. Other things equal, we expect more manufacturing-oriented states
to be more unionized, γ4 > 0.
At the national level, to reflect the industrial relations climate we used the number of
unfair labor practice allegations filed by firms. These data are not disaggregated by state,572 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
TABLE 3
Union Density and Fringe Benefits:  Top and Bottom States†
UNIZ:  Top 5 States UNIZ:  Bottom 5 States
UNIZ State FRINGE State UNIZ State FRINGE State
State (mean) Rank (mean) Rank State (mean) Rank (mean) Rank
W. Virginia 38.56 1 21.70 1 Arizona* 4.94 51 17.58  35
Indiana 38.37 2 20.43 4 N. Carolina* 5.32 50 16.84 46
Michigan 37.91 3 19.91 8 S. Carolina* 5.65 49 17.69 34
Ohio 33.75 4 20.09 7 Utah* 6.93 48 17.56 37
Washington 32.68 5 19.26 12 Florida* 7.14 47 17.07 43
FRINGE:  Top 5 States FRINGE:  Bottom 5 States
UNIZ State FRINGE State UNIZ State FRINGE State
State (mean) Rank (mean) Rank State (mean) Rank (mean) Rank
W. Virginia 38.56 1 21.70 1 Delaware 22.17 20 13.23 51
Montana 25.95 12 21.23 2 New Jersey 24.21 15 14.83 50
Maine 23.88 16 21.20 3 D.C. 14.49 35 14.93 49
Indiana 38.37 2 20.43 4 Minnesota 19.99 22 15.51 48
Iowa* 27.77 10 20.27 5 New York 25.14 13 15.96 47
† Sources are detailed in the appendix.
* State with a Right-to-Work law.
 but we can use the total number of unfair labor practice allegations filed by all parties. As
in the national analysis, we have no prior expectation of the sign for the coefficient.
The socio-political environment for organized labor differs across states. Twenty-
one states had Right-to-Work laws throughout the 1983-1996 period. Such legislation
means that workers cannot be compelled to support labor unions. It is well known
that union density is lower in Right-to-Work states, so we include the RTW indicator
for such states, expecting γ6 < 0.
With pooled data it is common to estimate parameters with a fixed effects specifi-
cation. In such a setting a separate intercept term is calculated for each cross section
while coefficients on the independent variables are common across all cross sections.
But in this case there are two fundamental problems with such an approach. First, the
FRINGE effect would not be allowed to vary across states, which is what we wish to
examine. Second, for the 1983-1996 sample period RTW laws were present in the
same twenty-one states, meaning the RTW variable would be perfectly collinear with
the intercept terms.
Instead of a fixed effects specification, we estimate a model with a common con-
stant and allow the FRINGE coefficient to vary across states. We also explored the
possibility of letting the other slope coefficients vary. Using a standard F-test [Balestra
1996, p. 37], we found it appropriate to vary only the FRINGE coefficients.12 Thus, the
equation we estimate is
(2´) UNIZit = γ0 + γ1UNIZit-1 + γ2iFRINGEit + γ3 RAISEit + γ4MFG SHAREit
 + γ5∆UNFAIRit + γ6RTWit + γ7UNEMPLOYit + ηit.573 DECLINING UNIONIZATION: DO FRINGE BENEFITS MATTER?
The pooled model represented in equation (2´) can be estimated by ordinary least
squares regression as long as there are no problems with the disturbances. As always,
with cross-sectional analysis we must beware of potential heteroskedasticty. Follow-
ing the Lagrange multiplier test procedure outlined by Greene [1993, p. 450], we
found evidence of heteroskedasticity. Consequently, we estimated the equation using
generalized least squares (GLS).
Empirical Results
The GLS coefficient estimates are presented in Table 4. As expected, unionization
is positively related to lagged union density. The structure of a state’s economy is also
significant. The MFG SHARE coefficient estimate indicates that a 10-point increase in
a state’s share of U.S. manufacturing employment adds 11.3 points to union density in
that state. States with relatively high unemployment also tend to be more unionized.
The presence of an RTW law reduces UNIZ by more than 9.3 points.
Turning to the influence of benefits, nearly all of the FRINGE coefficients are
significantly negative. Not only is unionization nationwide affected by the growing
role of benefits, in forty-five states and the District of Columbia union density is nega-
tively related to benefits (Table 4). This FRINGE effect is most pronounced for Califor-
nia and New York. For the two most populous states, a 10-point rise in FRINGE
means decreases in union density of 16.3 points and 11.6 points, respectively. At the
other extreme is Alabama, where the influence is a mere 1.7 points. Although FRINGE
generally exerts a negative impact on organized labor, there is wide variation across
the states.
Examining the FRINGE coefficients from Table 4 in more detail, we find other
important tendencies. Union-oriented states tend to exhibit a relatively small FRINGE
effect: three of the top five ranked union states are in the bottom half of the rankings
for FRINGE magnitude. In union-oriented states benefits are fairly prominent. More-
over, in such states organized labor is less sensitive to changes in the composition of pay.
Low UNIZ states, in contrast, tend to have relatively large FRINGE coefficients.
Of the ten states with the strongest FRINGE effects, six are in the bottom half of the
rankings by union density. In states where organized labor does not have a firm hold,
non-wage benefits appear to discourage unionization.
In the ten states where the FRINGE effect is most pronounced, seven are in the
bottom half of the rankings in terms of benefits. Unionization is most adversely af-
fected in those states where the benefits share has lagged behind the national aver-
age. Furthermore, several of those states — California, Massachusetts, New Jersey,
and New York — are known for relatively high taxes. In high-wage, high-tax states
workers may be happy to see pay tilted more towards un-taxed fringe benefits. When
FRINGE is increased, perhaps workers are pacified, thereby weakening demand for
union membership.
Most of the states in which the FRINGE effect is weakest are in the south or west.
Many of these states have RTW laws. Moreover, states like Alabama, Idaho, Louisi-
ana, and South Dakota have relatively small manufacturing sectors and low taxes.
Likewise, states with no significant FRINGE effect are similar. All five of them —
Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Nebraska, and North Dakota — have RTW laws.574 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
To summarize our findings, the negative impact of FRINGE on union density is
strongest for high population states with a large manufacturing presence, compara-
tively low union density, and high taxes. In the Right-to-Work states of the south and
west, where manufacturing is also less prominent, the influence of benefits is smaller.
In our national level analysis we found that between twelve percent and seven-
teen percent of the decline in union density could be attributed to the FRINGE effect.
Looking at the states individually, again we find that the impact of FRINGE is both
significant and large.
For each state we calculated the change in union density that could be attributed
to the expanded role of benefits (Table 5). For example, in California UNIZ dropped by
11.8 percentage points over the sample period. The FRINGE coefficient is -1.629 and
the state’s FRINGE values increased by 1.683 points. Consequently, FRINGE accounts
for approximately 2.7 points (-1.629 x 1.683) of the 11.8 point decrease in union den-
sity, more than one-fifth of the drop. As seen in the table, FRINGE accounted for
anywhere from 4.8 percent of the reduction in union density (Pennsylvania) to more
than half of the decline (Colorado, District of Columbia, Maine, Nevada, New Mexico,
South Carolina, and Vermont).
TABLE 4
Determinants of Union Density by State, 1983-1996†
Explanatory Coefficient  FRINGE coefficients (t-statistics), by state
Variable Hypothesis (t-statistic) Hypothesis: -
Rank                 Rank
Constant + or - 16.752** Ala. 47 -0.172* Ida. 46 -0.173
(6.135) (-1.911) (-1.531)
UNIZ + 0.597** Alk. 13 -0.802** Ill. 7 -0.902**
(lagged) (20.740) (-4.461) (-6.361)
RAISE + or - 0.006 Arz. 30 -0.502** Ind. 34 -0.424**
(0.361) (-4.822)  (-3.956)
MFG SHARE + 1.130** Ark. 43 -0.252** Iowa 51 -0.009
(3.589) (-2.751) (-0.093)
∆UNFAIR + or - 0.001 Cal. 1 -1.629** Kan. 49 -0.117
(1.300) (-6.893) (-1.316)
RTW - -9.366** Col. 4 -0.962** Ky. 28 -0.511**
(-3.386) (-6.540) (-4.270)
UNEMPLOY + or - 0.317** Conn. 9 -0.860** Lou. 44 -0.215**
(5.282) (-6.188) (-2.312)
Del. 14 -0.771** Me. 31 -0.482**
(-4.110) (-4.026)
D.C. 6 -0.913** Md. 26 -0.571**
(-4.614) (-4.493)
Fla. 23 -0.594** Mass. 3 -0.986**
(-5.324) (-7.230)
Geo. 29 -0.510** Mich. 25 -0.577**
(-4.656) (-4.984)
Haw. 36 -0.366** Minn. 11 -0.848**
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TABLE 4 (Cont.)
Determinants of Union Density by State, 1983-1996†
 FRINGE coefficients (t-statistics), by state
Hypothesis: -
Rank Rank Rank
Miss. 39 -0.338** N.C. 17 -0.730** Tenn. 40 -0.315**
(-3.435) (-5.757) (-3.372)
Mo. 19 -0.692** N.D. 50 -0.094 Tex. 18 -0.703**
(-5.292) (-0.869) (-5.443)
Mont. 33 -0.447** Ohio 21 -0.679** Utah 35 -0.413**
(-3.474) (-5.614) (-4.001)
Neb. 48  -0.161 Okla. 20 -0.684** Ver. 15 -0.757**
(-1.536) (-5.337) (-5.561)
Nev. 38 -0.345** Ore. 22 -0.630** Vir. 37 -0.351**
(-3.152) (-4.743) (-3.431)
N.H. 8 -0.877** Penn. 12 -0.818** Wash. 32 -0.449**
(-6.271) (-6.098) (-3.783)
N.J. 5 -0.948** R.I. 16 -0.742** W.V. 41 -0.279**
(-6.119) (-5.562) (-2.595)
N.M. 10 -0.857** S.C. 27 -0.530** Wisc. 24 -0.588**
(-5.851) (-5.096) (-4.836)




† Sources are detailed in the “Data Appendix.”
** Significant at the 0.05 level.
* Significant at the 0.10 level.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
The changing nature of compensation has affected union density. In the private
sector, as fringe benefits have become a more prominent component of workers’ pay,
ceteris paribus, union density has declined nationwide. Over the fifty-year period 1948-
1997, at least twelve percent of the drop in unionization can be attributed to the
growing role of non-wage benefits.
It appears that expanding fringe benefits “takes issues off the bargaining table,”
weakening support for unionization. As benefits such as health insurance and pen-
sions have become more prominent, especially in heavily populated areas like Califor-
nia and New York, workers have been less prone to unionize. Or perhaps workers
have become more reluctant to risk benefits in industrial action, thereby weakening
organized labor. An issue for further study would be how union organizing efforts or
strike activities have been influenced by fringe benefits.
For the private sector in general and manufacturing in particular, we have estab-
lished that unionization is related to the composition of pay. Yet the influence of non-
wage benefits may vary across industries or even different subsectors of manufactur-
ing. It remains to be seen whether there are similar findings for other sectors.576 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
TABLE 5
Impact of FRINGE on UNIZ by State, 1983-1996†
∆ ∆ ∆ ∆ ∆UNIZ, ∆ ∆ ∆ ∆ ∆UNIZ,
∆ ∆ ∆ ∆ ∆UNIZ, due to Share ∆ ∆ ∆ ∆ ∆UNIZ, due to Share
State 1983-1996 FRINGE (%) 1983-1996 FRINGE (%)
Alabama* -9.4 -0.5 5.1 Montana -19.1 -1.9 10.1
Alaska -16.0        -3.4 21.1 Nebraska* -8.5 0.0 0.0
Arizona* -3.9        -1.5 37.2 Nevada* -1.2 -0.7 59.9
Arkansas* -6.2        -0.9 14.7 New Hamp. -5.7 -2.1 37.3
California -11.8 -2.7 22.9 New Jersey -10.8 -1.5 13.7
Colorado -3.5 -2.4 68.8 New Mexico -3.0 -3.1 105.7
Connecticut -17.5 -2.7 15.4 New York -11.4 -2.5 21.6
Delaware -11.1 -3.0 26.7 N. Carolina* -4.4 -2.0 46.5
D.C. -2.7 -3.0 108.3 N. Dakota* -9.6 0.0 0.0
Florida* -3.3 -1.4 42.4 Ohio -9.6 -1.7 17.3
Georgia* -8.2 -1.6 19.1 Oklahoma -8.8 -4.1 46.0
Hawaii -16.8 -1.1 6.4 Oregon -9.0 -1.1 11.7
Idaho* -7.8 0.0 0.0 Pennsylvania -19.4 -0.9 4.8
Illinois -8.8 -1.5 17.2 Rhode Is. -5.9 -1.6  27.4
Indiana -19.1 -1.2 6.5 S. Carolina* -1.2 -1.3 105.3
Iowa* -18.8 0.0 0.0 S. Dakota* -9.3 -0.9 9.6
Kansas* -5.5 0.0 0.0 Tennessee*  -6.6 -1.2 18.5
Kentucky -14.8 -1.6 10.5 Texas* -7.6 -2.4 32.2
Louisiana* -5.9 -0.7 12.6 Utah* -9.5 -1.6  17.3
Maine  -1.2 -2.0 162.6 Vermont -5.3 -2.8 53.4
Maryland -7.2 -1.5 20.9 Virginia* -9.4 -1.1 12.0
Mass. -16.5 -1.6 10.0 Washington -6.5  -1.7 26.4
Michigan -11.3 -1.6 14.3 W. Virginia -12.1 -1.3 11.1
Minnesota -5.3 -1.9 36.0 Wisconsin -12.1 -0.6 5.3
Mississippi* -8.2 -0.9 11.3 Wyoming* -2.6 -1.0 39.2
Missouri -10.4 -1.3 12.3
† Sources are detailed in the appendix.
* State with a Right-to-Work law.
Not only has the growing prominence of fringe benefits affected unionization overall,
but also in virtually every state. In states where unions are relatively strong, orga-
nized labor has been less sensitive to changes in the composition of pay. But in states
where the share of fringe benefits has lagged behind, especially high tax states, orga-
nized labor is particularly sensitive to increases in benefits. In such areas, chiefly
those without Right-to-Work laws, employers may have used non-wage benefits to
forestall unionization. Perhaps future research will investigate in more detail whether
firms indeed have altered the wage-benefits mix strategically.
APPENDIX
National Data
Union Density. UNIZ figures for 1948-1982 are available from Troy and Sheflin
[1985, pp. A1-A3]. Observations for 1983-1997 are from Hirsch and Macpherson [1998,
p. 12]. For bibliographic citations, see “Data Sources” below.577 DECLINING UNIONIZATION: DO FRINGE BENEFITS MATTER?
APPENDIX — Continued
Non-wage Benefits. The U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (U.S. BEA) reports
information for “Total Compensation” in the private sector, which is decomposed as
“Wage Only” and “Supplements to Wages” (fringe benefits). To compute FRINGE, we
simply divided “Supplements to Wages” by “Total Compensation” [U.S. BEA, 1998, pp.
163-66]. RAISE is simply the percentage change in the “Wage Only” component of the
“Total Compensation” series, deflated to 1992 dollars using the GDP deflator [U.S.
BEA, 1998, pp. 159-62].
Other Explanatory Variables. DEMOCRAT is the percentage of Democratic
members of Congress. The number of Congressional Democrats is reported in
Famighetti [1999, pp. 89-90].
MANUFACTURE, the percentage of the civilian labor force in manufacturing, is
private sector manufacturing employment divided by the civilian labor force. The
former was downloaded from the BLS (Series ID: LFU11110020000); the latter is
reported by the U.S. BLS [2000, p. 166].
Data on unfair labor practice allegations come from the annual reports of the
National Labor Relations Board [1948-1997]. We downloaded the civilian unemploy-
ment rate, UNEMPLOY, from the BLS (Series ID: LFS21000000).
State-Level Data
Union Density. UNIZ for 1983-1996 is reported by Hirsch and Macpherson [1994-
1998] in the table “Union Membership, Density, Employment, and Earnings in Pri-
vate Sector Manufacturing by State.”
Non-wage Benefits. For 1987 and 1992 FRINGE is “Fringe Benefits” divided by
“Total Compensation,” information recorded by the Bureau of the Census (U.S. BOC)
in its Census of Manufactures [1987, Table 2; 1992, Table 2-3a].
For 1983-1986, 1989-1991, and 1994-1996 FRINGE is calculated with U.S. BOC
Annual Survey of Manufactures data, specifically, “Supplemental Labor Costs” divided
by the sum of “Supplemental Labor Costs” and “Payroll.” The supplemental costs
(another term for fringe benefits) are reported in Table 3 of the Surveys; payroll
figures (which reflect wage payments) appear in Table 1. No data were published for
1988 or 1993. We generated values for those years by interpolating.
Other Explanatory Variables. RAISE is calculated from the same data series
as FRINGE using the wage-only components. We calculated real earnings (1992 dol-
lars) using the GDP deflator.
MFG SHARE is a state’s share of U.S. manufacturing employment, reported by
the Census Bureau in Table 1 of its annual Surveys [U.S. BOC, 1986, 1991, 1996].
Hirsch and Macpherson [1994-1998] list the states with Right-to-Work Laws.
UNFAIR represents the total of all unfair labor practice allegations filed by all
parties with the NLRB. The data come from NLRB annual reports.
From the BLS, we downloaded the civilian unemployment rate, UNEMPLOY, for
each state and the District of Columbia (Series IDs: LAUST0x000003).578 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
APPENDIX — Continued
Data Sources
Famighetti, R., ed. World Almanac and Book of Facts 2000. Mahwah, N.J.: World Almanac Books, 1999.
Hirsch, B. T. and Macpherson, D. A. Union Membership and Earnings Databook: Compilations
from the Current Population Survey. Washington, D.C.: Bureau of National Affairs, 1994-1998.
National Labor Relations Board. Annual Report of the National Labor Relations Board. Washing-
ton, D.C.: GPO, 1948-1997.
Troy, L. and Sheflin, N. Union Sourcebook: Membership Structure, Finance, and Directory. First
edition. West Orange, N.J.: Industrial Relations Data Information Services, 1985.
U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (U.S. BEA). Survey of Current Business, August 1998. Wash-
ington, D.C.: GPO, 1998.
____________.   Employment and Earnings, January 2000. Washington, D.C.: GPO, 2000.
U.S. Bureau of the Census (U.S. BOC). Census of Manufactures. Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1987-1992.
____________.   Annual Survey of Manufactures. Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1983-1986, 1989-1991, and
1994-1996.
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mous referees for their comments. Thanks also to John Anderson, Craig MacPhee, James McClure,
Meghan Millea, David Rosenbaum, and Cary Thorp for helpful comments and suggestions. An
earlier version of this study was presented at IZA in Bonn. Econometric results, including those of
all diagnostic testing procedures, are available from Wayne Edwards at the University of Alaska
Anchorage, Economics Dept. RH307F, 3211 Providence Drive, Anchorage, AK 99508.
1. For discussion of findings and citations, see the symposium “The Future of Private Sector Unions
in the United States,” published in the Journal of Labor Research; particularly, see Fiorito [2001],
Kaufman [2001], Kleiner [2001], Lipset and Katchanovski [2001], Potter [2001], and Troy [2001].
2. According to U.S. Department of Labor classifications, mandated benefits consist of Social Secu-
rity, state and federal unemployment insurance, and workers’ compensation. Voluntary benefits
consist of paid leave, health insurance and other insurance, retirement and savings, and supple-
mental pay (meaning all other types of non-wage compensation).
3. Neumann and Rissman’s “hypothesis” formalizes an earlier observation by Reder [1951] that some
functions performed by labor unions had been taken over by the state. Others have questioned
whether there is empirical evidence to support the substitution hypothesis, for example, Chaison
and Rose [1991] and Stepina and Fiorito [1986].
4. A similar point has been made by Jacoby [1994].
5. Even at group rates, it can cost a worker several hundred dollars per month to buy health
insurance [Pauly, 1997, p. 1]. So in the event of a strike, it is likely that many workers could not
purchase sufficient insurance to replace lost coverage. Their worries may be compounded because
firms can hire replacement workers for strikers, threaten to relocate facilities if a strike contin-
ues, or unilaterally implement conditions of employment, all actions which have become more
common over time. Of course, if employers were to try to cut existing benefits, then workers may
be willing to strike to prevent such a roll back.
6. For example, Jones [1992] spliced the two series in her analysis of structural changes in the labor
market. Likewise, Booth [1995, p. 13] used the series interchangeably in her examination of union
density over time. Comparing unionization between the U.S. and Canada, Riddell [1993] also
combined both series.
7. Farber and Western [2001] argued that the CPS measure of union membership is biased and they
suggested a correction factor for the bias. In our sample, CPS figures are used for only a small
portion of the UNIZ series (1983-1997). Nevertheless, we also estimated a union density equation579 DECLINING UNIONIZATION: DO FRINGE BENEFITS MATTER?
using the Farber and Western correction factor on the CPS portion of the UNIZ series. None of
our findings was affected.
8. For details of the stationarity testing procedure, see Edwards [2000].
9. With time-series data we must beware of potential serial correlation. For both the truncated and
full data sets, we used the Breusch-Godfrey Lagrange multiplier test for serial correlation [Godfrey,
1988]. In both cases, we could not reject the null hypothesis of no serial correlation.
10. For details of the testing procedure, see Daniel and Terrell [1989, pp. 697-99].
11. In nine states and the District of Columbia UNIZ actually increased in the latter years of the
sample. Those states are: Colorado, Florida, Maine, Maryland, Missouri, Nevada, New Mexico,
South Dakota, and Vermont. Yet in all cases, 1996 union density was lower than for 1983.
12. The F-test compares a restricted specification, where the FRINGE coefficient is the only one
allowed to vary across states, to an unrestricted specification, where other parameter estimates
are allowed to vary. The null hypothesis is that only the FRINGE parameter estimates vary by
state; the test statistic follows an F distribution. We performed hypothesis tests for ten different
specifications against the null that only the FRINGE parameter estimates vary by state. The ten
specifications were as follows:
1 and 2. Vary the slope MFG SHARE parameter estimates by state, and then vary them by
region (with four regional designations used by the Bureau of Labor Statistics);
3 and 4. Vary the UNEMPLOY parameter estimates by state, and then by region;
5 and 6. Vary the ∆UNFAIR parameter estimates by state, and then by region;
7 and 8. Vary the RAISE parameter estimates by state, and then by region;
9 and 10. Vary the parameter estimates of all the independent variables by state, and
then by region.
In each case, the calculated F-statistic indicated that the null hypothesis could not be rejected. Only
the separate FRINGE coefficient estimates were statistically distinct from one another. So we
concluded that it was appropriate to vary only the FRINGE coefficient.
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